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Abstract 
In recent years, there has been a crisis of confidence in many empirical fields including 
psychology, regarding the reproducibility of scientific findings. Among several causes thought 
to have contributed to this situation, the inferential basis of traditional, or so-called frequentist 
statistics, is arguably chief among them. Of particular concern is null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST), which inadvertently became the de facto basis of scientific inference in the 
frequentist paradigm. The objective of this paper is to describe some of the most prominent 
issues plaguing frequentist inference, including NHST. In addition, some Bayesian benefits are 
introduced to show that it offers solutions to several problems inherent in frequentist statistics. 
The overall aim is to provide a non-threatening, conceptual overview of these concerns. The 
hope is that this will facilitate greater awareness and understanding of the need to address these 
matters in empirical psychology. 
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In recent years, a crisis of confidence has emerged in psychology (Ioannidis, 2005; John, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012; Pashler 
& Wagenmakers, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). However, psychology is not 
unique in this sense, given that the veracity of scientific findings have been questioned in 
several fields of study (Begley & Ellis, 2012; Button et al., 2013; Osherovich, 2011). 
The problem is multifaceted with a number of factors contributing to reproducibility 
issues in empirical science. For instance, one issue is publication bottlenecks that result from 
too much research competing for space in too few outlets. Another is bias toward aesthetically 
pleasing findings and presentation over genuine concern for truth (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). 
HARKing, or “hypothesizing after the results are known” (Kerr, 1998), is one example where 
aesthetic concern over ‘truth’ has creeped into our science. This happens when findings are 
presented with a perfect fit between one’s hypothesis and results, however, the hypothesis was 
in fact, formulated or amended after seeing the data. One reason for this is the notion that being 
wrong has somehow become a weakness in scientific papers, which only obfuscates the work, 
and confuses readers (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Indeed, a very small proportion of psychology 
papers report findings that disconfirm their initial hypotheses (Bones, 2012).   
In addition, there is the well-known file-drawer problem arising from journal-based bias 
toward novel findings, along with an unwillingness to publish null results (Ferguson & Heene, 
2012). Even high quality research yielding null results have tacitly been relegated to outlets 
created for this purpose, for example, PLOS Missing Pieces and the Journal of Articles in 
Support of the Null Hypothesis. While it is no doubt positive that such journals do exist, it 
underscores the fact that null results are not typically deemed suitable for publication in 
mainstream journals.   
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However, one of the most problematic practices that have likely contributed to the 
confidence crisis in psychology is the overreliance and misuse of null hypothesis significance 
testing (Szucs & Ioannides, 2017). This, despite substantial and prolonged criticism and calls 
for reform (Cohen, 1994; Halsey, Curran-Everett, Vowler, & Drummond, 2015; Johnson, 
2013; Nuzzo, 2014). A cursory inspection of empirical psychology journals reveal that classical 
(or so-called frequentist) statistics, and the practice of null hypothesis significance testing in 
particular, is still the default and dominant paradigm used for empirical research, and 
subsequent basis of scientific inference.  
Unfortunately, frequentist inference suffer from a number of weaknesses that are the 
cause of considerable issues in psychological science. The nature of these problems constitute 
strong reason to consider seriously these shortcomings and the potential of Bayesian inference 
to advance the way we do empirical research in psychology. The aim of this paper is not to 
‘convert’ frequentist researchers to Bayesians, but to discuss some of the most salient criticisms 
of the frequentist paradigm and to briefly point to some advantages of Bayesian inference (see 
also Dienes, 2008; 2011; Lambert, 2018; Wagenmakers, Lee, Lodewyckx, & Iverson, 2009; 
Wagenmakers et al., 2017).  
The goal is to facilitate conceptual understanding of the inherent problems of 
frequentist statistics, so that researchers get a better ‘feel’ for the reason to change our practice, 
rather than simply being told that they should. This paper in no way represents a comprehensive 
discussion of a large and at times obscure issue, but seeks to prime a recognition of the need to 
change our practice and to provide some guideposts in that direction. 
2. Null hypothesis significance testing 
Broadly speaking, in classical (or frequentist) based research, scientific inference proceeds by 
designing studies in which data are collected and corresponding probabilities (p-values) 
generated. These p-values are the conditional probabilities of obtaining the observed data or 
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more extreme data given the null hypothesis (H0).The p-values are compared to a set criterion 
(level of significance), which is used as a decision mechanism regarding hypotheses of interest. 
Typically, this entails rejecting the H0 when p < .05. Failure to reject the H0 occurs when the 
p-value is larger than the set threshold (p > .05). This p-value driven practice is known as null 
hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Although the use of p-values is essentially routine 
practice in psychological research, it is commonly misunderstood by students and researchers 
alike (Haller & Krauss, 2002; Oakes, 1986). The inferential basis of conclusions drawn from 
data following this routine procedure in the frequentist paradigm has been on the receiving end 
of substantial criticism for decades (Grigerenzer, 1998; 2004).  
According to Cohen (1994), the first book length treatment of this issue appeared as far 
back as 1957. By 1970 an edited book titled ‘The Significance Test Controversy’ was published 
in which NHST was again criticized across the board (Morrison & Henkel, 1970). In it, one of 
the authors, Paul Meehl, portrayed NHST as "a potent but sterile intellectual rake who leaves 
in his merry path a long train of ravished maidens but no viable scientific offspring" (p. 265). 
These legitimate criticisms have not subsided over the years and continues to this day. This is 
because the practice of NHST has continued largely unabated since then. The recent replication 
crisis (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012) in psychology again brought the issue to the fore.   
The subsequent 2015 Science article by the Open Science Collaboration, which 
reported results of a large-scale replication effort in psychology, provided empirical support of 
these long-standing criticisms. For the first time the magnitude of the problem was investigated 
empirically and could it now be quantified to some degree. In fairness, NHST is only one of 
several issues contributing to the reproducibility crisis. So, what then is the problem with 
NHST? This question is considered next, followed by a discussion of some additional 
frequentist problems. The paper concludes by presenting selected benefits of Bayesian 
inference as a viable alternative to frequentist inference. 
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2.1. Problems with NHST 
As already mentioned, NHST functions as a decision mechanism in frequentist statistics 
(Dienes, 2008) where we compare an obtained p-value to a set criterion (commonly .05 or .01). 
Conventionally, if the observed p > .05, we fail to reject a null hypothesis, and if p < .05 we 
reject the null hypothesis. This is the way researchers typically report results in journal articles 
and what we teach our students. However, failing to reject the null hypothesis does not 
constitute evidence for it, and neither does rejecting the null hypothesis (H0) necessarily mean 
we found evidence to support the alternative hypothesis (H1). The inferential decision 
procedure based on this routine and ‘mindless’ use of p-values lies at the heart of the issue 
(Dienes, 2008; Grigerenzer, 2004).  
2.2. p-values   
The problem with p-values is that they are highly susceptible to misinterpretation. Common 
misconceptions include the notion that a p-value reflects the probability that an observed result 
is due to sampling error or a chance effect; the probability that the null hypothesis is true based 
on the data; or the probability that the alternative hypothesis is true given the data (Kline, 2004).  
In addition, p-values are believed to reflect the magnitude of an effect, in the sense that small 
p-values are thought to reflect large effects and vice versa; rejection of the H0 is interpreted as 
confirmation of the H1; and failure to reject the H0 is considered evidence in support of it (Kline, 
2004). If none of the above represents a correct interpretation, what then is a p-value?  
A p-value is the conditional probability of encountering a test statistic as extreme, or 
more extreme than the one observed, assuming the null hypothesis is true. It takes the form  
p(D | H0) which is the probability (p) of the observed data (D) given ( | ) the null hypothesis 
(H0). Important to note is that a p-value is a conditional probability that takes the truth of the 
H0 as given. As such, no hypothesis is being tested. Neither the probability of the null p(H0 | 
D) or the probability of the alternative hypothesis  p(H1 | D) is being evaluated. The null is 
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considered true a priori, and what is expected under the alternative hypothesis is just not 
actually considered (Wagenmakers et al., 2017).  
At this point, a frequentist reader may object by arguing that when we design our 
studies, we are really trying to show evidence of some effect, which would typically be our 
alternative hypothesis. If our data suggest that we should reject the null (p < .05), surely we 
have then obtained evidence for the alternative hypothesis? Unfortunately, it does not follow 
logically that if the null hypothesis is extremely unlikely, that the alternative hypothesis must 
therefore be true. Consider the following syllogisms that Wagenmakers et al. (2017) use to 
demonstrate the error contained this view (see also Pollard & Richardson, 1987 and Rouder, 
Morey, Verhagen, Province, & Wagenmakers, 2016). 
Example A:   
(Premise)   If Tracy is an American then it is very unlikely that she is a US congresswoman; 
(Premise)   Tracy is a US congresswoman;        
(Conclusion)   It is very likely that Tracy is not an American.     
or  
Example B: 
(Premise)  If an individual is a man, he is unlikely to be the Pope;  
(Premise)  Francis is the Pope;  
(Conclusion)  Francis is probably not a man. 
 
In both examples, it should be clear that despite the probability of the hypothesis being very 
unlikely, it clearly would make no sense to infer the opposite when the unlikely event is 
realized. To the contrary, it is impossible to become a congresswoman if one is not an 
American, or to become Pope if one is female (Pollard & Richardson, 1987).  
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These syllogisms would however, be valid forms of propositional logic, specifically 
modus tollens arguments, if the terms related to likelihood (i.e., unlikely, very likely, probably) 
were removed. Modus tollens is a well-known valid form of deductive reasoning. The problem 
is that the conclusion in a deductive argument is only valid when the premises are completely 
true (Manktelow, 2012). Unfortunately, neither human reasoning nor scientific inquiry 
proceeds on the basis of deductive reasoning. Rather, it is probabilistic and inductive (Chater 
& Oaksford, 2008; Manktelow, 2012). The unfortunate irony is that this erroneous form of 
reasoning became conventional practice and the basis of scientific inference in frequentist 
statistics. NHST-based inference using p-values takes exactly the same form as these syllogistic 
arguments (Pollard & Richardson, 1987; Rouder et al., 2016). Expressed as a syllogism, NHST 
takes this form: 
(Premise)  If the H0 is true, then is it very unlikely that I will observe result X 
(Premise)  I observe result X 
(Conclusion)  Therefore, it is very likely that the H0 is not true 
While this may not immediately strike one as problematic, examples A and B above show the 
error contained in this form of reasoning. Importantly, these syllogisms show that it is possible 
for the observed data to be extreme under both the null and the alternative hypotheses at the 
same time. In fact, the data can simultaneously be extreme under the null hypothesis, and 
impossible under the alternative hypothesis (Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017).  
 Another inferential error of NHST occurs when we infer one conditional probability 
from knowing its inverse, because, we believe it to be the same thing. For instance, in NHST 
we compute the conditional probability of the observed data under the null hypothesis. When 
this probability is sufficiently small (i.e., p < .05), we reject the null hypothesis. Thus we are 
interpreting this result as its inverse, as the probability of the null hypothesis given the observed 
data p(H0 | D). However, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, because it is assumed to be 
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true. At best, we can conclude that the data is very unlikely under the null hypothesis. The 
probability of the data given the null hypothesis is not the same as the probability of the null 
hypothesis given the data p(D | H0) ≠  p(H0 | D). Dienes (2008) clearly illustrates the problem 
that arises when one infers a conditional probability from its inverse as follows:  
The probability of being dead given that a shark has bitten one’s head clean off, p(dead | 
head bitten clean off by shark), is 1. But the probability that a shark has bitten one’s head 
clean off given that one is dead, p(head bitten clean off by shark | dead), is very close to 
zero. Most people die of other causes. (p. 276)  
This example shows how problematic it is to equate the probability of the observed data given 
that the null hypothesis is true p(D | H0), with the probability that the null hypothesis is true 
given the observed data  p(H0) | D). The probability of the latter p(H0 | D) is never considered 
in the frequentist paradigm. Accordingly, one cannot make pronouncements regarding the 
likelihood of the null hypothesis in the frequentist approach. Such an inference, can however, 
be made in the Bayesian framework (see section on Bayesian inference below).  
Indeed, the logic of p-values is convoluted, in the sense that we really want to show the 
existence of some effect (H1), so we postulate that there is no effect (H0 = 0), hoping that the 
data will show that this cannot be the case (H0 = rejected because p < .05), so that we can then 
infer that the effect we are interested in must therefore exist (H1 = True). Not only is the 
inferential process tortured, it is not logically coherent, as we saw above. 
A further irony is that despite the ubiquity of NHST in many fields, including 
psychology, it fails to provide the information that researchers presumably seek. Wagenmakers 
(2007) argues that researchers are not actually interested in knowing the probability of 
encountering a statistic as extreme or more than the one observed, given that the null hypothesis 
is true (i.e., the information obtained from NHST). What they really want to know is how much 
evidence the observed data provides for one hypothesis relative to another hypothesis. 
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So how did NHST using p-values as a decision procedure come about? Over time the 
evidential notion of p-values as conceptualized by Sir Ronald Fisher, along with Jersey 
Neyman and Egon Pearson’s decision procedure for managing Type I and II error rates (α, β; 
also introducing the concepts of power and H1), somehow became conflated (Szucs & 
Ioannides, 2017). However, these ideas are to a large degree, incompatible (see Hubbard & 
Bayarri, 2003 for more detail on this issue). The inadvertent merger of these two different 
procedures eventually became a fait accompli. This outcome has been lamented by many 
commentators (Hubbard & Bayarri, 2003; Christensen, 2005; Gigerenzer, 1993, 1998, 2004; 
Grigerenzer Krauss, & Vitouch, 2004), arguing that the existing approach has essentially 
become meaningless in applied research (Wagenmakers, Lee et al., 2009). 
3. Further issues with frequentist inference 
In frequentist statistics, evidence is not quantified. According to Wagenmakers, Lee et al. 
(2009), Fisher himself was of the opinion that p-values constitute evidence against the null 
hypothesis. However, this would require that p-values should at minimum conform to the 
requirement of consistency when used to evaluate evidence. This would necessitate a p-value 
of say, .05 to reflect the same amount of evidence in a sample with 12 observations and in a 
sample with 1200 observations. Unfortunately, it does not. Despite considerable debates 
regarding the evidential load of p-values in different sample sizes it turns out that a p-value of 
.05 actually reflect more evidence for some effect in a small sample than in a large sample 
(Wagenmakers, Lee et al., 2009). However, this does not mean that a statistically significant 
effect observed in a small sample will be robust. This is another common misinterpretation of 
NHST. In fact, it is much more likely that an effect will be overestimated in small samples 
compared to large samples due to increased measurement error. This is an error which Loken 
and Gelman (2017) refers to as the “what does not kill statistical significance makes it stronger” 
fallacy (p. 584).    
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A further underappreciated, but critical issue, is the fact that frequentist inference 
depends on the subjective intentions of the researcher. This refers to the fact that the sampling 
intentions of the researcher is a critical determinant of the final p-value upon which conclusions 
will be drawn. For example, different stopping intentions in the data collection process can 
yield different p-values for exactly the same data. Berger and Wolpert’s classic story involving 
a frequentist statistician and a naïve scientist (1988, p. 30-33) makes the bizarre consequences 
of this practice evident. The story is repeated here in full to retain its impact:   
The naïve scientist has obtained 100 independent observations that are assumed to 
originate from a normal distribution with mean θ and standard deviation 1. In order to 
test the null hypothesis that θ = 0, the scientist consults a frequentist statistician. The 
mean of the observations is 0.2, and hence the p-value is a little smaller than .05, which 
leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis. However, the statistician decides to probe 
deeper into the problem and asks the scientist what he would have done in the fictional 
case that the experiment had not yielded a significant result after 100 observations. The 
scientist replies that he would have collected another 100 observations. Thus, it may be 
hypothesized that the implicit sampling plan was not to collect 100 observation and 
stop; instead, the implicit sampling plan was to first take 100 observations and check 
whether p < .05. When the check is successful, the experiment stops, but when the check 
fails, another 100 observations are collected and added to the first 100, after which the 
experiment stops. The statistician then succeeds in convincing the scientist that use of 
the implicit sampling plan requires a correction in order to keep the Type I error rate at 
p = .05. Unfortunately, this correction for planning multiple tests now leads to a p-value 
that is no longer significant. Therefore, the puzzled scientist is forced to continue the 
experiment and collect an additional 100 observations. Note that the interpretation of 
the data (i.e., significant or not significant), depends on what the scientist was planning 
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to do in a situation that did not actually occur. If the very same data had been collected 
by a scientist who had answered the statistician's question by saying, whether truthfully 
or not, “I would not have collected any more observations", then the data would have 
been judged to be significant. Same data, different inference. But the story becomes 
even more peculiar. Assume that the scientist collects the next 100 observations, and 
sets up another meeting with the statistician. The data are now significant. The 
statistician, however, persists and asks what the scientist would have done in case the 
experiment had not yielded a significant result after 200 observations. Suppose that the 
scientist now answers: This would have depended on the status of my grant renewal; If 
my grant is renewed, I would have had enough funds to test another 100 observations. 
If my grant is not renewed, I would have had to stop the experiment. Not that this 
matters, of course, because the data were significant anyway". The frequentist 
statistician then explains that the inference depends on the grant renewal; if the grant is 
not renewed, the sampling plan stands and no correction is necessary. But if the grant 
is renewed, the scientist could have collected more data, in the fictional case that the 
data would not have been significant after 200 observations. This calls for a correction 
for planning multiple tests, similar to the first one. The story concludes with the scientist 
resolving to never again share with the statistician the options he considers under 
different conditions.  
In addition to exact researcher intentions, this story also shows how p-values are dependent on 
unobserved data and decisions that were never made. This refers to the fact that p-values are 
affected by data that were never observed (i.e., the hypothetical sampling distribution). This 
however, is argued to be a violation of the conditionality principle that statistical conclusions 
should only be based on actual observed data (see Wagenmakers 2007 and Berger & Wolpert, 
1988 for detailed discussions of the issue).  
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Arguably, the most troubling aspect of NHST, is the fact that a statistically significant 
result can always be obtained (whether .05 or .01). This can be achieved by continually 
calculating p-values as the data comes in and stopping as soon as it drops below the set 
significance level. In frequentist statistics, this is guaranteed to happen eventually, even if the 
null hypothesis is known to be true (Armitage, McPherson & Rowe, 1969; Dienes, 2011; 2016; 
Meehl, 1990; Wagenmakers 2007). Not only will 5% of findings be statistically significant in 
the long run when the H0 is true (Szucs & Ioannides, 2017), the probability of false positives is 
further compounded by so-called researcher degrees of freedom.  
This refers to a researcher’s decision flexibility during a study. Researchers have 
substantial discretion regarding the hypotheses to be tested, the design of the study, the analyses 
conducted and the reporting of results, which can each have a substantial and untoward 
influence on the final p-value obtained (Simmons et al., 2011). Although researcher degrees of 
freedom is something that has to be dealt with in any statistical paradigm, in NHST the problem 
has culminated in so-called p-hacking (Ioannides, 2005). This refers to the opportunistic use of 
researcher degrees of freedom in an effort to obtain statistically significant results, since non-
significant results are unlikely to get published in peer-reviewed journals (Simmons et al., 
2011). Common examples include the decision to run some additional participants when faced 
with a non-significant result, or making use of multiple comparisons that were never part of 
the initial analysis plan. There are a myriad of such seemingly benign decisions which greatly 
inflate the chance of finding false positive results (Wicherts et al. 2016). While pre-registration 
have in recent years gained much traction as a mechanism to reduce the adverse effect of 
researcher degrees of freedom, by making a clear distinction between exploratory and 
confirmatory research (Wagenmakers, Wetsels, Borsboom, Van der Maas & Kievit, 2012), it 
remains a widespread problem. Fortunately, many journals have now implemented compulsory 
pre-registration practices for confirmatory research and the list is growing (Wicherts et al. 
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2016). In the next section we consider Bayesian inference, an alternative paradigm that 
provides solutions to several of the issues plaguing frequentist statistics. 
4. Bayesian inference 
Bayesian inference is described only insofar as it enables discussion of selected Bayesian 
benefits over some frequentist problems highlighted above. The objective here is not to provide 
a comprehensive introduction to Bayesian statistics, or to fully explicate it (for more 
comprehensive treatments of Bayesian inference see e.g., Bernardo & Smith, 1994; Jaynes, 
2003; Jeffreys, 1961; Lambert, 2018). Rather, the goal is to draw attention to some of the 
solutions that Bayesian statistics provide to several of the issues in NHST that impedes proper 
scientific inference.   
First, it is important to note that there is an important philosophical distinction between 
Bayesian and frequentist statistics. According to Dienes (2008) Bayesian statistics uses 
probability to quantify uncertainty, or degree of belief. Thus, in the Bayesian paradigm, 
probability distributions are used to represent states of belief. This requires the use of priors. 
Priors are probability distributions used to represent what we believe or know about some state 
of the world before we observe the data. They are explicitly modeled in Bayesian statistics. 
Although the subjective nature of priors are criticized by frequentists, Bayesians point out there 
is subjectivity present in all analyses. In fact, it is considered a strength that subjectivity is made 
explicit in Bayesian analysis (Lambert, 2018), and that existing knowledge is formally 
incorporated into new conclusions (Nuzzo, 2014).  
These prior beliefs are then updated via the likelihood to a posterior set of beliefs. 
Simply stated, it is the degree to which we should change our prior beliefs in the face of the 
present data (likelihood), to a new and updated set of beliefs (posterior distribution). Bayes’ 
rule provides an optimal way with which to update prior beliefs in the face of evidence or 
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observed data. Accordingly, “Bayes' rule states that the posterior distribution is proportional to 
the product of the prior and the likelihood” (Wagenmakers, Lee et al., 2009, p. 10). 
This stands in contrast to the frequentist assumption of probability as long-run 
frequency. In this paradigm, probability is used to inform us about the relative frequency of an 
event over the long run, that is, how often something is expected to happen in an infinite series 
of exact replications. When, for example, we want to examine the relationship between two 
variables, X and Y, by computing a correlation coefficient in frequentist statistics, we are in 
effect asking “assuming the null hypothesis that r = 0, what is the probability of obtaining our 
observed effect, or one that is even more extreme?  
For frequentists, uncertainty resides in the hypothetical sampling distribution with the 
population parameter(s) being fixed (Zepher & Oswald, 2015). In this case, that the correlation 
is zero. In contrast, in the Bayesian paradigm probability is directed to the parameter(s) of 
interest, where uncertainty about the parameter is quantified by a range of probabilistic values 
based on actual observed data (Zepher & Oswald, 2015). Thus, in frequentist statistics, the 
parameters are fixed (null hypothesis assumed true) and the data considered variable (one 
sample from a hypothetically infinite sample possibilities), whereas, in Bayesian statistics, the 
parameters are variable and the data is considered constant or fixed (Zepher & Oswald, 2015).  
5. Advantages of Bayesian inference 
Arguably, one of the most useful features of Bayesian statistics is the ability to quantify 
evidence. For instance, the Bayesian answer to the fact that evidence is not quantified in 
frequentist statistics is the Bayes factor, “the primary tool used in Bayesian inference for 
hypothesis testing and model selection” (Berger, 2006, p. 378). Bayes factors quantify evidence 
from observed data on a continuous scale for and against the null and alternative hypothesis 
(Wagenmakers et al. 2017). Bayes factors indicate the degree to which the data supports the 
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null hypothesis, the alternative hypothesis, or neither hypothesis (Berger, 2006; see also 
Wagenmakers, Love et al. 2018 for suggested Bayes factor interpretation guidelines). 
In contrast to NHST where no hypothesis is directly being tested because the null is 
assumed to be true, Bayes factors provide direct support for each hypothesis under 
consideration. Importantly, this includes the null hypothesis. For example, the Bayes factor 
could show that the H0 is 5 times more likely than the H1 under the present data, or that the 
data is 14 times more likely under the H1 than under the H0, or that the data is insensitive and 
does not provide clear evidence in support of either hypothesis (Dienes, 2016). Notice, the 
probability of both the H0 and the H1 is explicitly being evaluated. Thus, we are not asking 
about the likelihood of getting the data we did while accepting the truth of the null  p(data | 
H0), we are asking how much evidence the present data provides for one hypothesis relative to 
another hypothesis or  p(H0 | data) vs  p(H1 | data). We might also want to quantify the 
confidence in parameters. For instance, we could determine how much more likely one 
parameter estimate is over another, say .25 over .35, using the Savage Dickey density ratio 
(Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2009). We could also determine the 
posterior probability of a certain parameter value, or determine which parameter values the 
data and priors make 95% probable, in a similar sense as the frequentist confidence interval. 
Although Bayesian credible intervals are somewhat similar to well-known confidence 
intervals used in frequentist statistics, it is important to note that there is a critical conceptual 
difference between them. As a reminder, in frequentist statistics, a 95% confidence interval for 
an estimated parameter refers to an interval that in the case of repeated sampling will have a 
95% probability of containing the true value of the population parameter (for a detailed 
discussion see Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2016).  As such, it is not 
possible to know if a true value falls within the 95% confidence interval of any given sample 
in the frequentist paradigm. In contrast, one can directly determine the 95% probability of a 
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true value falling in a Bayesian credible interval (Morey et al., 2016). Thus, Bayesian inference 
using credible intervals tells us what we want to know, but cannot know when using frequentist 
confidence intervals.  
Another important benefit of Bayesian statistics is that evidence can be continually 
computed and updated as the data comes in. This is possible because all inferences in Bayesian 
statistics are based on actual observed data (Wagenmakers et al., 2017) This is a major 
advantage of Bayesian over frequentist methods because inference is not dependent on data 
that was never observed (e.g., hypothetical sampling distribution), or the exact intentions with 
which data was collected (Dienes, 2008). 
Lastly, Wagenmakers et al. (2017) note that in contrast to frequentist statistics, 
Bayesian inference is logically coherent and internally consistent. Thus, none of the 
consistency and coherence issues plaguing frequentist statistics are present in the Bayesian 
paradigm. This is guaranteed because Bayesian inference conforms to the axioms of probability 
theory, which is argued to be the cornerstone of Bayesian statistics (Lindley, 1985, 2000, 2006). 
6. Conclusion 
Some of the most problematic and pervasive problems afflicting scientific inference using 
frequentist statistics were described in this paper. It should, hopefully, be evident how the 
inferential shortcomings of frequentist statistics could contribute to reproducibility challenges 
in psychology. In addition, it becomes apparent that the choices we make as methodologists 
and substantive researchers is a critical determinant of this process. For researchers wishing to 
do meaningful and robust work, these issues are unavoidable. Moreover, if we want our 
scientific efforts to be, and remain credible, we will also have to address them explicitly in our 
teaching. The selection of frequentist problems described in this paper was by no means 
exhaustive and only selected Bayesian benefits were described. Readers are encouraged to 
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peruse the references for work that offers comprehensive and technically detailed treatments 
of the points raised in this paper. 
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